

Secure compilation and hyperproperty preservation

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Abstract—The area of secure compilation aims to design compilers which produce hardened code that can withstand attacks from low-level co-linked components. So far, there is no formal correctness criterion for secure compilers that comes with a clear understanding of what security properties the criterion actually provides. Ideally, we would like a criterion that, if fulfilled by a compiler, guarantees that large classes of security properties of source language programs continue to hold in the compiled program, even as the compiled program is run against adversaries with low-level attack capabilities. This paper provides such a novel correctness criterion for secure compilers, called *trace-preserving compilation* (TPC). We show that, in a specific technical sense, TPC preserves a large class of security properties, namely all safety hyperproperties. Further, we show that TPC preserves more properties than full abstraction, the de-facto criterion used for secure compilation. Then, we show that several fully abstract compilers described in literature satisfy an additional, common property, which implies that they also satisfy TPC. As an illustration, we prove that a fully abstract compiler from a typed source language to an untyped target language satisfies TPC.

This paper uses colors to distinguish elements of different languages. For a good experience, please print/view it in color.

I. INTRODUCTION

Many high-level languages offer security features to programmers in the form of type systems, encapsulation primitives and so forth. Programs written in these high-level languages are ultimately translated into executable code in a low-level, target language by a compiler. Most target languages do not offer the same security features as high-level source languages, so target-level programs are subject to attacks such as control flow hijacking as well as reading/writing of private data or even code. One way to prevent these attacks is to use a compiler that produces target-level programs that are as secure as their source-level counterparts. Such compilers are generically called *secure compilers*.

Researchers have investigated secure compilation predominantly in the form of fully abstract compilation (or analogous notions) [1], [7], [8], [17], [24], [5], [27], [21], [20], [40], [32], [2], [3], [4], [31], [36], [29], [38], which means that source-level program equivalence is preserved and reflected by compilation or, in other words, two source-level programs are equivalent iff their compilations are equivalent. Fully abstract compilation is a useful extensional soundness criterion for secure compilers, as it ensures the absence of target-level attacks like control flow hijacks. However the specific security properties preserved by a fully abstract compiler depend on the definition of program equivalence in the source and target lan-

guages. In particular, to preserve different security properties, the definitions of equivalence must be changed appropriately. This variable definition of full abstraction does not yield a *criterion* for compiler security. As a result, many existing work on secure compilation [5], [24], [7], [8], [21], [27], [38], [40] uses a *single, standard* notion of full abstraction obtained by defining program equivalence as contextual equivalence in all possible contexts. However, it is unclear what security properties are preserved by this criterion and, as we show later, obvious security properties are *not* preserved by it (Section II).

Motivated by this, we ask whether we can find a different criterion for soundness of secure compilers that is guaranteed to preserve a large class of security properties. As a first step in this direction, we present *trace preserving compilation* (TPC), an *intensional* criterion for compiler correctness that we show preserves an entire class of security properties, namely all hypersafety properties [19]. TPC is based on the notion of trace semantics. Intuitively, a trace-preserving compiler generates code modules that (i) preserve the behaviour of their source-level counterparts when the low-level environment provides valid inputs and (ii) correctly identify and recover from invalid inputs. Invalid inputs are those that have no source-level counterpart (e.g., if booleans are encoded as the integers 0 and 1 by the compiler, then 2 would be an invalid boolean input in the target). Condition (i) implies what is often called *correct compilation*—that the target preserves source behaviour when all interacting components have been compiled using the same (or an equivalent) compiler. Condition (ii) ensures that compiled code detects and responds appropriately to target-level attacks. (We provide a more detailed overview of these notions in Section II.)

Technically, we identify two different strategies for responding to invalid inputs, thus obtaining two slightly different characterizations of TPC (Section III). After defining TPC, we prove that it preserves all hypersafety properties (Section IV) in a specific technical sense. In prior work, hypersafety properties have been shown to capture many security-relevant properties including all safety properties as well as information flow properties like noninterference [19]. Hence, showing that TPC preserves all hypersafety properties implies that it also preserves these specific properties.

Next, we study the relationship between TPC and fully abstract compilation. We show that TPC is stronger than the standard notion of fully abstract compilation (Section V) under *injectivity*, a specific condition on translation of input and output symbols that full abstraction requires. We further

show that under another assumption, which we call fail-safe behaviour or *FSB* (compiled code modules immediately terminate on invalid inputs), correct compilation is equivalent to (a form of) **TPC** (Section VI). As many existing fully-abstract compilers also happen to be correct and *FSB*, they also achieve **TPC**.

The formal setting in which we study **TPC** is deterministic reactive programs. This is the minimal interesting setting in which one can examine trace-based notions such as hyperproperties. Our formal model of reactive programs abstracts over the code of modules, retaining only their I/O behaviour. This suffices for defining **TPC**. However, in writing a compiler, one must be concerned with the code. To bridge this gap, we show by example in Section VI how our definition applies to a concrete language (a typed lambda-calculus) and a concrete compiler for it. Specifically, we state *FSB* in terms of contextual equivalence and show that the fully abstract compiler of Devriese *et al.* [21] satisfies *FSB* and is, therefore, **TPC**. This implies that the compiler preserves all hypersafety properties. We believe this observation also applies to other fully abstract compilers [7], [8], [27], [5], [38], [29], [24], [40].

To summarize, the contributions of this paper are:

- a new intensional soundness criterion for secure compilation (**TPC**);
- a proof that **TPC** preserves all hypersafety properties (in a specific technical sense);
- the relation between **TPC** and fully abstract compilation, the current standard for secure compilation, and a proof that **TPC** is stronger;
- a property that many existing fully abstract compilers satisfy, which implies that they also satisfy **TPC**, hence showing that **TPC** already exists in current secure compilers.

Full proofs of theorems and additional discussion can be found in a companion technical report [41].

II. INFORMAL OVERVIEW

This section provides an overview of the programming model and compilers we consider (Section II-A and Section II-B respectively). Then it defines compiler properties (Section II-C) such as correctness and full abstraction. We then present shortcomings of compiler full abstraction to motivate the need for a new compiler soundness criterion (Section II-D). Finally, we discuss the contributions of this paper—the new soundness criterion for secure compilation (Section II-E).

Colour convention: We use **blue, bold** font for *source* elements, **red, sans-serif** font for *target* elements and *black* for elements common to both languages (to avoid repeating similar definitions twice). Thus, **C** is a source-level program, **C** is a target-level program and *C* is generic notation for either a source-level or a target-level program.

A. Reactive Programs

We study the secure compilation of *deterministic reactive programs*. A reactive program contains some internal state, which is not directly observable and reacts to a stream of

inputs from the environment by producing a stream of observable *outputs*. After each input, the program may update its internal state, allowing all past inputs to influence an output. By definition, a reactive program is really a *component* of a larger program that provides it inputs (we use the terms components and programs to refer to the same notion).

Definition 1 (Reactive language). A reactive language is a tuple (I, O, P, ρ) . I, O are sets of input and output actions. P is the set of all possible programs or components (all sets we consider are finite or countably infinite). $\rho : I \times P \rightarrow O \times P$ is a transition function that represents the language semantics. We overload the notation and use P for program states too. Elements of I, O and P are written $\alpha?, \alpha!$ and C , respectively. When component C is given input $\alpha?$, it produces the output $\alpha!$ and advances internally to the state C' if $\rho(\alpha?, C) = (\alpha!, C')$. Termination (as well as divergence) are special outputs after which the component keeps responding only with the same action, so it *stutters*.

A reactive program includes mutable, unobservable internal state as well as code. The code is left abstract but we often use concrete syntax in examples and explanations. Implicitly, the considered programs are *input total*, i.e., they react to all possible inputs. We use the adjective “initial” with a program to indicate the situation prior to any interaction with the environment.

Definition 2 (Traces). A trace, written $\bar{\alpha}$, is an infinite sequence of alternating input-output actions, so $\bar{\alpha} \equiv \alpha_1?, \alpha_1!, \alpha_2?, \alpha_2!, \dots$ where \equiv denotes syntactic equivalence. All actions are taken from the alphabet $A^\alpha = I \cup O$. Whenever we write α , we implicitly mean $\alpha \in A^\alpha$.

A trace $\alpha_1?\alpha_1!\dots$ is in the behaviours of an initial program C^0 when there is a sequence of states C_1, \dots, C_n, \dots such that for each $j \geq 1$, $\rho(\alpha_j?, C_{j-1}) = (\alpha_j!, C_j)$. The set of all traces of C^0 is written $TR(C^0)$.

In general, two programs are said to be *contextually equivalent* when they cannot be distinguished by any context. In our reactive setting, contextual equivalence coincides with trace equivalence.

Definition 3 (Trace equivalence). Two programs are trace equivalent, written $C_1 \stackrel{T}{\equiv} C_2$, if their trace semantics coincide. $C_1 \stackrel{T}{\equiv} C_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} TR(C_1) = TR(C_2)$.

We now present an example of a trivial reactive language.

Example 1 (A reactive language for booleans). Consider a source language \mathcal{S} that only includes terminating programs that compute the boolean identity function. Internally, these programs can do arbitrary computation, but they take a boolean as input and produce the same boolean as output. We omit the full syntax and semantics of *internal* reductions, which can be thought of as a typed lambda calculus. Intuitively, input actions **i_{id}** can be thought of as function calls, while output ones **o_{id}**

can be seen as returns.

inputs $\mathbf{i}_{\text{id}} = \{ \text{id}(\text{true})?, \text{id}(\text{false})? \}$
 outputs $\mathbf{o}_{\text{id}} = \{ \text{ret}(\text{true})!, \text{ret}(\text{false})! \}$
 programs $\mathbf{id} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda x.x, \mathbf{id}_{\text{not}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda x.\text{not}(\text{not } x), \dots$

Any infinite concatenation of the two trace fragments below describe the possible behaviour of *any* program in \mathcal{S} .

$\alpha_{\text{t}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{id}(\text{true})? \cdot \text{ret}(\text{true})!$
 $\alpha_{\text{f}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{id}(\text{false})? \cdot \text{ret}(\text{false})!$

Since the traces of all programs in \mathcal{S} are the same, any two programs in \mathcal{S} are trace-equivalent. \square

B. Compilers

A compiler is a tool that (among other things) transforms initial programs of a source language to initial programs of a target language, relative to a coding of source inputs and outputs in the target. Let $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{P}, \rho)$ and $\mathcal{T} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{P}, \rho)$ be a source and a target language, respectively.

Definition 4 (Compiler). A compiler from \mathcal{S} to \mathcal{T} is a triple $(\approx_I, \approx_O, \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}})$, where \approx_I and \approx_O are relations on $\mathbf{I} \times \mathbf{I}$ and $\mathbf{O} \times \mathbf{O}$ that represent coding of inputs and outputs respectively, and $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} : \mathbf{P} \rightarrow \mathbf{P}$ is a function that translates source initial components to target initial ones. We assume that \approx_I and \approx_O satisfy the following two conditions (stated here only for \approx_I for brevity):

(Totality) For every $\alpha^? \in \mathbf{I}$, there exists $\alpha^? \in \mathbf{I}$ such that $\alpha^? \approx_I \alpha^?$.

(Functionality) $\alpha_1^? \approx_I \alpha^?$ and $\alpha_2^? \approx_I \alpha^?$ imply $\alpha_1^? = \alpha_2^?$

Relations \approx_I and \approx_O specify how inputs and outputs are coded by the compiler. For instance, if a compiler maps the input **true** to the input **1**, then we would have $\text{true} \approx_I \mathbf{1}$. Totality is essential since a compiler should consider all source behaviour. Functionality is not necessary for compilers in general, but in the context of preserving security properties, it is essential to avoid conflating (through compilation) distinct source symbols that a property of interest treats differently. For example, in information flow security, relating a public and a private source action to the same target action would make it impossible to talk about the preservation of a property like noninterference.

Throughout this paper, we write \approx in place of both \approx_I and \approx_O and often refer to a compiler as just the function $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$, assuming implicitly that \approx is given. \approx is lifted to traces point-wise (Rule Relate-trace).

$$\frac{\alpha_1 \approx \alpha_1 \quad \alpha_2, \dots \approx \alpha_2, \dots}{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots \approx \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots} \text{(Relate-trace)}$$

C. Compiler Properties

This section presents two compiler properties, correctness and full abstraction, that are often used together as a criterion for the soundness of a secure compiler. Correctness (Definition 5) states that the compiler preserves source program behaviour up to \approx . CC denotes the set of all correct compilers.

Definition 5 (Compiler correctness). A compiler $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$ is correct, denoted $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in CC$, if $\forall \mathbf{C}, \bar{\alpha}, \bar{\alpha}. \bar{\alpha} \in \text{TR}(\mathbf{C})$ and $\bar{\alpha} \approx \bar{\alpha}$ imply $\bar{\alpha} \in \text{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}})$.

Compiler full abstraction is the most-widely used soundness criterion for secure compilation. It states that the compiler preserves and reflects some notion of program equivalence. The general idea behind full abstraction is that the abilities of the context (the attacker) often differ between the source and the target. For instance, in a target language that is assembly, the context may be able to access private fields of an object directly through load/store instructions, but this access may be prohibited to source-level contexts by the source semantics. A fully abstract compiler can rule out such attacks by ensuring (often through dynamic checks) that the power of an attacker interacting with the compiled program in the target language is limited to attacks that could also be performed by some source language attacker interacting with the source program.

Nonetheless, the specific security properties preserved by a secure compiler depend on the chosen notion of program equivalence. In the secure compilation literature, the most commonly chosen notion of program equivalence is contextual equivalence (indistinguishability by any context in the language), which, as noted before, coincides with trace equivalence in our setting. This corresponds to the following definition of full abstraction. We re-emphasize that this is just one possible definition of full abstraction (the most commonly used), based on the most commonly used notion of program equivalence.

Definition 6 (Full abstraction). A compiler $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$ is fully abstract, denoted $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in FA$, if $\forall \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{C}'. \mathbf{C} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{C}'$ if and only if $\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \sqsubseteq \llbracket \mathbf{C}' \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$.

D. Shortcomings of Full Abstraction for Security

Most existing work on secure compilation proves (or assumes) compiler correctness and proves compiler full abstraction in the sense defined above. We now show that some intuitive and interesting security properties are *not* necessarily preserved by such a compiler. This justifies the need for a new soundness criterion for secure compilation. The need for new soundness criteria has also pointed out by other recent work [40], [29], [42].

Example 2 (Safety violation). Consider a source language whose only data type is booleans and that only admits the constant function that always returns **true**. Consider a target language \mathcal{T} (called $\lambda^{\mathbb{N}}$ in the remainder of the paper) whose programs perform operations on natural numbers, so they input numbers and output numbers. Consider a trivial compiler $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$ from \mathcal{S} to \mathcal{T} that maps any source program to the target program $\lambda x. \text{if } x < 2 \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0$.

Under the coding $\text{true} \approx \mathbf{1}$ and $\text{false} \approx \mathbf{0}$, this compiler is both correct and fully abstract (trivially). However, this compiler does not preserve even trivial properties like “never output false”. In the source, this property cannot be violated (since the only allowed functions always output **true**). In the

target, the property would naturally translate to “never output 0” but on input 2, compiled programs output 0 and violate the property. \square

One may argue that there is, in fact, a gap in this argument since we have not formally specified how to translate a source property to the target language and have relied on an intuitive translation. Indeed, there is no single canonical translation of properties in literature, and this problem was identified by Abadi over a decade ago [1]. However, for a *safety* property like the one above, where the goal is for the program to not reach an unsafe state (or produce an unsafe output), a natural translation would rule out the translations of outputs that the source property rules out.

To summarize, this example identifies two problems:

- 1) It is unclear what it means to preserve a source-language property in the target language as the two languages can be different (this subject is further developed in Section IV-B);
- 2) Standard full abstraction and compiler correctness do not preserve all safety properties under an intuitive translation of properties.

The novel secure compilation criterion we propose preserves all safety properties under a translation that we prove to preserve the intuitive meaning of safety properties (as described in Section IV-B3).

Example 3 (Confidentiality violation). Consider the source language of Example 2 but with a simple addition: these programs now store a boolean secret in their internal state. All programs of this language always returns **true** except on the 10th input, where they output the boolean secret. Their traces can therefore be as in Figure 1 (the indices t and f indicate the internally stored secret).




Fig. 1. Source and target traces for Example 3.

Consider the following declassification property: “Do not

output the secret until the 10th input”. All source programs satisfy this property.

Consider $\lambda^{\mathbb{N}}$, the target language of Example 2 that inputs and outputs natural numbers, and the same coding \approx . Consider a compiler that translates source programs to behave exactly as in the source if the input is 1 or 0 (the encodings of **true** and **false**), but to output the secret *immediately* if the input is any number greater than 1. A subset of the semantics of compiled components is also presented in Figure 1.

This compiler is correct, because correctness is concerned only with target traces that are translated from the source, and compiled components have traces α_t and α_f (as well as elided ones) that derive from α_t and α_f . The compiler is also fully abstract: source programs with the same trace semantics have the same trace semantics at the target as well.

However, again, the compiled programs do not satisfy the intended declassification property: they can be caused to leak the secret at any time, even before the 10th input, as in α_u and α'_u by providing 2 as the input. \square

A bit of analysis shows the precise shortcoming of compiler correctness and full abstraction as a joint soundness criteria in these examples and for secure compilation in general. Call a target input α *invalid* if it does not code a source input, i.e., if there is no $\alpha?$ such that $\alpha? \approx \alpha?$. Compiler correctness does not handle these inputs since it states that a compiled program should behave exactly like the source program while the (target) inputs are *valid*. However, once an invalid input is received by a compiled program, compiler correctness does not constrain the behaviour of the program further. It is this lack of constraint that Example 2 exploits. Furthermore, for a pair of *distinguishable* source programs, full abstraction says nothing if the compiler is correct. Consequently, two distinguishable source programs are allowed to differ in an arbitrary manner after an invalid input is received in the target, while the property of interest may care *how* the programs differ. Example 3 exploits this freedom.

(Some readers may argue that we should not call a compiler correct if we do not consider all possible inputs that the compiled code can receive. However, compiler correctness is always defined for programs that interact with target-level programs that also have source-level counterparts—often they are obtained via the same compiler—because that is what is expected in the absence of an adversary.)

It should be clear that the problem here is the freedom of behaviour on invalid inputs. The novel compiler security criterion we propose (TPC) curtails this freedom by defining precisely how the program should behave on invalid inputs.

Remark: A viable criticism of our analysis of Examples 2 and 3 is that one could change the notion of the source and target program equivalence in the definition of full abstraction to capture the required properties precisely. In fact, early work on full abstraction for secure compilation [4] kept the choice of the program equivalence relation open. However, note that a flexible definition of full abstraction does not lend itself to a viable criterion for compiler design. When the compiler is

written, one may not know what properties would be of interest for programs that will be compiled later, so what notion of full abstraction should the compiler adhere to? In contrast, what we propose is a *fixed* criterion for compiler security that preserves classes of security properties.

E. Trace-Preserving Compilation (TPC), Informally

Informally, a compiler $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$ from \mathcal{S} to \mathcal{T} is trace-preserving (Definition 1) if it produces components $\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$ whose traces are either source-level traces ($\mathbf{TR}(\mathbf{C})$) or invalid traces ($\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{C}}$).

Informal definition 1 (Trace-preserving compiler, informally). $\forall \mathbf{C} \in \mathcal{S}. \mathbf{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}) = \mathbf{TR}(\mathbf{C}) \cup \mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{C}}$.

The first part of the union in Definition 1 states that traces of a compiled component \mathbf{C} must include *all* the source-level traces of \mathbf{C} (i.e., the “valid traces”). This ensures that a **TPC** compiler is correct. The second part of the union, $\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{C}}$, contains only traces that contain at least one invalid input (inputs that are not related to anything in the source) and specifies how the compiled code must react to such inputs. Specifically, we require that the output in response to an invalid input be *fresh* and *opaque*. Fresh means that the output must not be related to a source symbol (to prevent outputting of symbols that are forbidden by a source safety property of interest, as in Example 2), while opaque means that the output must not depend on any hidden internal state (to prevent information leaks, as in Example 3). We denote such a fresh and opaque output with a \checkmark .

Example 4 (Invalid traces). Consider the following trace for the source language of Example 1, the target language $\lambda^{\mathbf{N}}$ from Example 2 and the same coding \approx of Example 2. Let \checkmark be any output in the target that is not related under \approx to any source symbol.

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_{\text{valid}} &= \text{id(false)}? \text{ret false!} \dots \\ \alpha_{\text{invalid}} &= \text{id(3)}? \text{ret false!} \dots \\ \alpha_{\text{tick}} &= \text{id(3)}? \checkmark \dots \end{aligned}$$

α_{valid} is a valid source trace, while α_{invalid} is a trace that cannot exist in the source. Due to the definition of \approx , α_{tick} is a good example of an invalid target trace (as we mean them), as no trace in the source relates to it and it reveals no information about the program’s internal state. \square

The idea to respond in a fresh and opaque way to ill-formed inputs is not novel. Existing fully abstract secure compilers already react to invalid inputs in this way [38], [40], [24], [5], [27], [31]. Our contribution is in formalizing this idea and in establishing formally what it means in terms of preservation of classes of hyperproperties.

Concretely, we identify two different ways to respond to invalid inputs:

- 1) *halting* the component forever;
- 2) *disregarding* the invalid input.

Item 1 is the strategy used by the prior work mentioned above; it does not return control to the attacker. This strategy also encompasses divergence on an invalid input.

Item 2 covers a different scenario, where the availability of the component is crucial and therefore it must not stop responding in the future. A number of real world applications fall in this scenario, most predominantly servers, which need to continue running even if malformed (possibly malicious) input is received. A possible implementation of this scenario could be that a trusted kernel is notified on invalid input and the kernel resets the compiled component to a known good state. These two ways of responding to invalid inputs yield two different variants of **TPC**, which we call the “halting” and “disregarding” variants.

A simple way to realize **TPC** in a compiler is to correctly compile a component (not worrying about security) and then wrap the compiled component in a layer that detects invalid inputs and reacts to them using one of the two strategies listed above. Only valid inputs are passed to the actual component. Although this strategy has runtime overhead, it is, in fact, how the existing compilers mentioned above attain full abstraction (which is why these compilers also have **TPC**—see Section V).

Having defined the formal setting and the intuition behind the contribution of this work, we now define **TPC** formally.

III. TRACE-PRESERVING COMPILATION

This section defines **TPC** in both its halting and disregarding variants (Definition 7 and Definition 8, respectively).

We introduce some notation used in the remainder of this paper.

Notation 1 (Notation for traces and other formal details).

- given a trace $\bar{\alpha} = \alpha_1?, \alpha_1!, \alpha_2?, \alpha_2!, \dots$, define functions $\bar{\alpha}|_I$ and $\bar{\alpha}|_O$ to project its inputs and outputs as follows: $\bar{\alpha}|_I = \alpha_1?, \alpha_2?, \dots$ and $\bar{\alpha}|_O = \alpha_1!, \alpha_2!, \dots$
- denote a set of elements of type t as \hat{t} or $\{t\}$.
- denote the cardinality of a set \hat{t} as $\|\hat{t}\|$.
- denote a set of traces as $\hat{\alpha}$.
- denote a set of sets of traces as \mathbb{T} (so it should be $\hat{\hat{t}}$).
- indicate finite traces prefixes (sometimes called just traces or finite traces with some abuse of terminology) using the metavariable \bar{m} .
- $\bar{m} \leq \bar{\alpha}'$ means that \bar{m} is a prefix of $\bar{\alpha}'$, so $\bar{\alpha}' \equiv \bar{m}\bar{\alpha}''$ for some $\bar{\alpha}''$.
- lift the prefix notion to sets of traces as follows: $\hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha}'$ if $\forall \bar{m} \in \hat{m}, \exists \bar{\alpha}' \in \hat{\alpha}'. \bar{m} \leq \bar{\alpha}'$.
- define the set of odd-length prefixes of a set of traces as follows: $\text{op}(\hat{\alpha}) = \{\bar{m}\alpha? \mid \bar{m}\alpha? \leq \hat{\alpha}\}$.
- define the observables of a trace as all the even-length, finite prefixes of that trace: $\text{obs}(\bar{\alpha}) = \{\bar{m}'\alpha!\alpha! \mid \bar{m}'\alpha!\alpha! \leq \bar{\alpha}\} \cup \{\epsilon\}$
- lift relation \approx to sets, denoted as $\hat{\alpha} \approx \hat{\beta}$, as: $\forall \bar{\alpha} \in \hat{\alpha}. \exists \bar{\beta} \in \hat{\beta}. \bar{\alpha} \approx \bar{\beta}$ and $\forall \bar{\beta} \in \hat{\beta}. \exists \bar{\alpha} \in \hat{\alpha}. \bar{\beta} \approx \bar{\alpha}$.

The first definition of **TPC** this section formalises is TP^H , the halting variant of **TPC**.

Definition 7 (TPC, halting). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP^H \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \mathbf{C}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S) &= \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \exists \bar{\alpha} \in \text{TR}(\mathbf{C}). \bar{\alpha} \approx \bar{\alpha}\} \cup \\ &\quad \{\bar{m}\alpha? \checkmark \bar{\alpha}' \mid \exists \bar{m} \in \text{obs}(\text{TR}(\mathbf{C})). \bar{m} \approx \bar{m} \\ &\quad \text{and } \forall \alpha' \in \bar{\alpha}'|_O. \alpha' \equiv \checkmark \\ &\quad \text{and } \nexists \bar{m}\alpha? \in \text{op}(\text{TR}(\mathbf{C})). \bar{m}\alpha? \approx \bar{m}\alpha?\} \end{aligned}$$

The first component of the union is the set of valid traces, i.e., those that have a source-level counterpart. We often refer to this set as $\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{C}}$, so $\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{C}} = \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \exists \bar{\alpha} \in \text{TR}(\mathbf{C}). \bar{\alpha} \approx \bar{\alpha}\}$. The second component of the union, which we refer to as $\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{C}}$, is the set of invalid traces, which contain a prefix of a valid trace (\bar{m}) followed by an invalid action ($\alpha?$) which is responded to with \checkmark . From there on ($\bar{\alpha}'$), all outputs must be \checkmark , i.e., the trace stutters on \checkmark , which is a terminating symbol. From the formal language perspective, we have that $\checkmark \in \mathbf{O}$.

To define the “disregarding” version of TPC, which we write TP , we need additional machinery. Two prefixes are up-to-tick equivalent, written $\bar{m} \lambda \bar{m}'$, if they are the same once they are stripped of all their \checkmark s and of the input actions immediately preceding them. Let $\widehat{\checkmark} \subseteq \mathbf{O}$ be a set of target output actions that have no source counterparts and let $\checkmark_1, \checkmark_2, \dots$ be any ordered sequence of actions from $\widehat{\checkmark}$ whose elements need not be distinct.

Definition 8 (TPC, disregarding). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \mathbf{C}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S) &= \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \text{obs}(\bar{\alpha}) = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \text{int}_n(\mathbf{C})\} \quad \text{where} \\ \text{int}_0(\mathbf{C}) &= \{\bar{m} \mid \exists \bar{m} \in \text{obs}(\text{TR}(\mathbf{C})). \bar{m} \approx \bar{m}\} \\ \text{int}_{n+1}(\mathbf{C}) &= \{\bar{m} \mid \bar{m} \equiv \bar{m}_1\alpha?\checkmark_{n+1}\bar{m}_2 \text{ and } \bar{m}_1\bar{m}_2 \in \text{int}_n(\mathbf{C}) \\ &\quad \text{and } \forall \bar{m}' \lambda \bar{m}_1, \nexists \bar{m}\alpha? \in \text{op}(\text{TR}(\mathbf{C})). \\ &\quad \bar{m}\alpha? \approx \bar{m}'\alpha? \text{ and } \forall \alpha! \in \bar{m}_2|_O. \alpha! \notin \widehat{\checkmark}\} \end{aligned}$$

To contemplate all possible interleavings of all possible bad actions, we consider all observables of all actions that a compiled components must have. These observables are defined inductively. The base case identifies the same set $\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{C}}$ as in Definition 7. The inductive case adds one more invalid action with a \checkmark response in response to the last invalid input on the trace. Intuitively, $\text{int}_0(\cdot)$ yields all traces with a source-level counterpart, while $\text{int}_n(\cdot)$ yields all traces that contain exactly n invalid inputs, to which the compiled program responds with $\checkmark_1, \dots, \checkmark_n$ respectively. \checkmark s must be used monotonically based on the ordering of the sequence because they should convey only information that is already available to the environment after an interaction, i.e., the number of past interactions.

By definition, the halting version of TPC implies the disregarding one. To see this, given a \checkmark in the halting version, one can choose $\widehat{\checkmark} = \{\checkmark\}$ and the sequence $[\checkmark, \checkmark, \dots]$ in the disregarding version.

Theorem 1 (Halting implies disregarding). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP^H \Rightarrow \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP$.

Next, we relate TPC to refinement: If a compiler is TP , then the behaviours of a source program are contained in the

behaviours of the compiled program (up to \approx). Let \preceq denote $\subseteq \circ \approx$.

Theorem 2 (Source programs refine their compiled counterparts). $\forall \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP, \forall \mathbf{C}. \text{TR}(\mathbf{C}) \preceq \text{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S)$.

The next theorem states that equivalent programs have the same set of invalid traces.

Theorem 3 (Equivalent programs have the same invalid traces). $\forall \mathbf{C}_1, \mathbf{C}_2. \mathbf{C}_1 \stackrel{\text{T}}{=} \mathbf{C}_2 \Rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{C}_1} = \mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{C}_2}$.

IV. TRACE-PRESERVING COMPILATION AND HYPERPROPERTY PRESERVATION

This section describes hyperproperties and their subclasses (Section IV-A). Then it proves what two security-relevant subclasses of hyperproperties, namely safety and hypersafety, are preserved by TPC (Section IV-B). Finally, it describes some classes of hyperproperties that are not preserved by TPC (Section IV-C).

A. Hyperproperties

Hyperproperties [19] are a formal representation of predicates on programs, i.e., they are predicates on sets of traces. They capture many security-relevant properties including not just conventional safety and liveness (i.e., predicates on traces), but also properties like non-interference (i.e., predicates on sets of traces).

Denote the set of hyperproperties as \mathbf{HP} . An element of this set is denoted $\mathbb{P} \in \mathbf{HP}$. So, $\mathbb{P} = \{\widehat{m}_i\}_{i \in I}$ where I is countable. A program C has a hyperproperty \mathbb{P} if $\text{TR}(C) \in \mathbb{P}$.

The following formalisation is taken from the work of Clarkson and Schneider [19] and adapted to our notion of traces. Denote a sequence of infinite observables with $\bar{\alpha}^\omega$ and of finite observables with $\bar{\alpha}^n$ (for some natural number n). The set of infinite traces is denoted with Φ_{inf} while that of finite traces is denoted with Φ_{fin} . We lift these concepts to the hyperproperty level by introducing $Prop$ and Obs . Let \mathcal{P} denote the powerset function and \mathcal{P}^f the set of all finite subsets.

Definition 9 ($\Phi_{inf}, \Phi_{fin}, Prop$ and Obs).

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\alpha}^\omega &= \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \nexists n \in \mathbb{N}. \bar{\alpha} \equiv \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n\} \\ \bar{\alpha}^n &= \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \bar{\alpha} \equiv \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n \wedge n \in \mathbb{N}\} \\ \Phi_{inf} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \bar{\alpha} \in \bar{\alpha}^\omega\} & \Phi_{fin} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \bar{\alpha} \in \bar{\alpha}^n\} \\ Prop &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{P}(\Phi_{inf}) & Obs &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{P}^f(\Phi_{fin}) \end{aligned}$$

Two core classes of hyperproperties exist: safety hyperproperties (also called hypersafety) and liveness hyperproperties (also called hyperliveness), which are described below.

Given a property p its equivalent hyperproperty, called its lift, is denoted $[p]$. By definition, $[p] = \mathcal{P}(p)$.

1) *Hypersafety*: A hyperproperty is hypersafety if it does not allow bad things to happen. Let \mathbf{SHP} denote the set of all safety hyperproperties.

Definition 10 (Hypersafety). $\mathbb{P} \in \mathbf{SHP} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \hat{\alpha} \in \text{Prop}. \hat{\alpha} \notin \mathbb{P} \Rightarrow (\exists \hat{m} \in \text{Obs}. \hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha} \text{ and } (\forall \hat{\alpha}' \in \text{Prop}. \hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha}' \Rightarrow \hat{\alpha}' \notin \mathbb{P}))$.

Intuitively, for a hyperproperty to be hypersafe, all the sets of traces in it must not contain all prefixes in any of the \hat{m} 's that specify “bad things”. The set of all the \hat{m} 's characterizes the hypersafety property. The lift of safety properties is a subset of **SHP** and it is denoted as $\lceil S \rceil$.

Example 5 (SHP examples). Examples of **SHP** include termination-insensitive non-interference, observational determinism and all safety properties [19]. \square

2) *Hyperliveness*: A hyperproperty is hyperlive if it always allows for a good thing to happen (Definition 11). Let **LHP** denote the set of all safety hyperproperties.

Definition 11 (Hyperliveness). $\mathbb{L} \in \mathbf{LHP} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \hat{m} \in \text{Obs}. (\exists \hat{\alpha}' \in \text{Prop}. \hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha}' \wedge \hat{\alpha}' \in \mathbb{L})$.

Every hyperproperty is the intersection of a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty.

Theorem 4 (HP composition [19]). $\forall \mathbb{P} \in \mathbf{HP}. \exists \mathbb{S} \in \mathbf{SHP}, \mathbb{L} \in \mathbf{LHP}. \mathbb{P} = \mathbb{S} \cap \mathbb{L}$.

B. Preserving hypersafety via TP

The question that we want to address next is: how can one translate a property from a source language to a target language and preserve it (up to the translation) via compilation? “Meaning preservation” is the trickier part of the question, because the two languages are often so different that this is unclear. In fact, we do not believe that there is a general way to translate arbitrary (hyper)properties. Here, we restrict attention to two subclasses of hyperproperties—safety and hypersafety—which are (a) relevant for many security applications, and (b) easy to treat formally since they can be characterized uniformly: a safety (hypersafety) property can be expressed as a set of bad prefixes (set of set of bad prefixes). For each of the two subclasses, we describe how to translate source properties to the target and show that any **TPC** compiler preserves the properties under this translation. Note that our technical development for hypersafety subsumes that for safety; we present the latter separately only for exposition purposes.

1) *Safety Preservation*: We now present our result about safety properties. Informally, a safety property prevents bad things from happening [9]. Formally a safety property S (a set of traces) is characterized as follows:

$\forall \bar{\alpha}. \text{ if } \bar{\alpha} \notin S \text{ then } (\exists \bar{m} \leq \bar{\alpha} \text{ and } \forall \bar{\alpha}'. \text{ if } \bar{m} \leq \bar{\alpha}' \text{ then } \bar{\alpha}' \notin S)$

A trace ($\bar{\alpha}$) is not valid if it has a “bad” prefix \bar{m} that no valid trace has.

Since the \bar{m} is quantified for all $\bar{\alpha}$, we can redefine a safety property by relying on a set of bad prefixes \hat{m} that is the set obtained by taking all the existentially-quantified \bar{m} . A safety property S is thus redefined as follows. Let $\hat{m} :: S$ denote that

\hat{m} is the set of all bad prefixes that characterises the safety property S .

if $\hat{m} :: S$ then $\bar{\alpha} \notin S$ iff $\exists \bar{m} \in \hat{m}. \bar{m} \leq \bar{\alpha}$

In this way we can define a safety property by the set of all possible bad prefixes that a good trace must not have.

Next, we need to translate a safety property from a source to a target language. To do so, we translate the set of bad prefixes from the source to the target language and obtain a set of bad prefixes expressed in the target language. However, there is still a concern: the target language can have more actions that are not expressible in the source—the invalid input actions—and outputs produced in response to them. Ideally, we would like to be conservative with respect to these invalid actions and add any prefix with an invalid input to the set of bad prefixes in the target. This ensures that all good traces in the target safety property relate good traces in the source safety property. This is a safe choice.

However, this ideal translation is unrealisable since the adversarial environment, not the compiled program, provides invalid inputs. Thus, if we call all traces with invalid inputs “bad”, then we cannot ever hope to preserve safety properties. To still achieve this, we create a small exception: we admit traces with invalid inputs, if the invalid inputs are immediately succeeded by \checkmark outputs. This is a reasonable compromise since \checkmark outputs have no source counterparts (so the source property could not possibly be talking about them), and they reveal no information by definition. This can be generalized to allow the i th invalid input to be followed by \checkmark_i for some pre-determined sequence $\checkmark_1, \checkmark_2, \dots$ of possibly different \checkmark 's.

This idea of translating safety properties is formalised in Definition 12.

Definition 12 (Safety relation). Two sets of prefixes define the same safety property, denoted as $\hat{m} \stackrel{\text{sp}}{\approx} \hat{m}'$ if:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{m} &= \{ \bar{m} \mid \exists \bar{m} \in \hat{m}. \bar{m} \approx \bar{m} \} \\ &\cup \{ \bar{m}\alpha?\alpha! \mid \exists \bar{m} \in \hat{m}, \bar{m}'.\bar{m} \approx \bar{m}' \wedge \bar{m} \\ &\text{and } \nexists \bar{m}\alpha? \in \text{op}(\hat{m}). \bar{m}\alpha? \approx \bar{m}'\alpha? \\ &\text{and } \alpha! \neq \checkmark_{i+1} \\ &\text{where } \|\bar{m}\|_O \cap \hat{\checkmark} = i \} \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 5 states that a trace-preserving compiler preserves safety properties in the sense of Definition 12.

Theorem 5 (Safety preservation). Let $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP$. Let \mathbf{S}, \hat{m} be such that $\hat{m} :: \mathbf{S}$. Take \hat{m} and \mathbf{S} such that $\hat{m} :: \mathbf{S}$ and such that $\hat{m} \stackrel{\text{sp}}{\approx} \hat{m}$. Then, for all \mathbf{C} , $\mathbf{TR}(\mathbf{C}) \subseteq \mathbf{S}$ implies $\mathbf{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S) \subseteq \mathbf{S}$.

Proof Sketch. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that $\mathbf{TR}(\mathbf{C}) \subseteq \mathbf{S}$ but $\mathbf{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S) \not\subseteq \mathbf{S}$. Then $\mathbf{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S)$ must have a trace with a prefix in \hat{m} . We consider two cases. If the prefix contains no invalid input, then by the definition of TP , it must correspond to a source prefix in \hat{m} . Moreover, $\mathbf{TR}(\mathbf{C})$ must have a trace that extends \hat{m} . It follows immediately that $\mathbf{TR}(\mathbf{C}) \not\subseteq \mathbf{S}$. A contradiction. If the prefix has an invalid

input, by $[\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in TP$, the i th such input must be followed by the i th tick from $\hat{\checkmark}$ (for every i). Hence, the prefix cannot be in $\hat{\mathbb{M}}$ by $\hat{\mathbb{M}}$'s definition. Again, a contradiction. \square

2) *Hypersafety Preservation*: Next, we turn to the preservation of hypersafety properties. Unlike safety, which is concerned with single traces, hypersafety is concerned with multiple traces, which lets it capture properties like non-interference. The intuition behind hypersafety is that a set of traces is bad if it has a set of bad prefixes that no good set of traces has. As we can see, the intuition is just like safety, with just one more “level” of sets. Formally, a safety hyperproperty \mathbb{S} (a set of sets of traces) is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall \hat{\alpha} \text{ if } \hat{\alpha} \notin \mathbb{S} \\ & \text{then } (\exists \hat{m}. \hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha} \text{ and } (\forall \hat{\alpha}'. \text{ if } \hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha}' \text{ then } \hat{\alpha}' \notin \mathbb{S})) \end{aligned}$$

We can characterize every hypersafety property based on the set of set of bad prefixes. We write $\mathbb{M} :: \mathbb{S}$ to mean that \mathbb{M} is the set of all sets of bad prefixes that characterises the safety hyperproperty \mathbb{S} .

$$\text{if } \mathbb{M} :: \mathbb{S} \text{ then } \hat{\alpha} \notin \mathbb{S} \text{ iff } \exists \hat{m} \in \mathbb{M}. \hat{m} \leq \hat{\alpha}$$

We define the translation of the set of sets of source bad prefixes by translating all of them under \approx . The key technical difference with respect to safety preservation is that we treat as bad singleton sets of all traces in which the i th invalid input is not immediately succeeded by \checkmark_i . The addition of singleton sets is the minimum addition we can make to the set of invalid prefixes to ensure that any (translated) program that contains even one trace wherein a response to an invalid input is not from \checkmark is considered bad.

This idea of translating hypersafety is formalised in Definition 13.

Definition 13 (Hypersafety relation). Two sets of sets prefixes define the same safety hyperproperty, denoted as $\mathbb{M} \overset{\text{SHP}}{\approx} \mathbb{M}'$ if:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{M} = & \{ \hat{\mathbb{M}} \mid \exists \hat{\mathbb{M}} \in \mathbb{M}. \hat{\mathbb{M}} \approx \hat{\mathbb{M}} \} \cup \\ & \{ \{ \hat{\mathbb{M}}\alpha? \} \mid \exists \hat{\mathbb{M}} \in \mathbb{M}. \exists \hat{\mathbb{M}} \in \hat{\mathbb{M}}, \hat{\mathbb{M}}. \hat{\mathbb{M}} \approx \hat{\mathbb{M}}' \wedge \hat{\mathbb{M}} \\ & \text{and } \hat{\mathbb{M}}' \in \mathbb{M}. \exists \hat{\mathbb{M}}'\alpha? \in \hat{\mathbb{M}}'. \hat{\mathbb{M}}'\alpha? \approx \hat{\mathbb{M}}\alpha? \\ & \text{and } \alpha! \neq \checkmark_{i+1} \\ & \text{where } \|\hat{\mathbb{M}}\|_O \cap \hat{\checkmark} = i \} \end{aligned}$$

Any trace-preserving compiler preserves all hypersafety properties, as Theorem 6 captures.

Theorem 6 (Hypersafety preservation). Let $[\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in TP$. Let \mathbb{S}, \mathbb{M} be such that $\mathbb{M} :: \mathbb{S}$. Let \mathbb{M}' and \mathbb{S}' such that $\mathbb{M}' :: \mathbb{S}'$ and such that $\mathbb{M} \overset{\text{SHP}}{\approx} \mathbb{M}'$. Then, for all \mathbb{C} , $\text{TR}(\mathbb{C}) \in \mathbb{S}$ implies $\text{TR}([\mathbb{C}]_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}) \in \mathbb{S}'$.

The proof follows the same intuition as that of Theorem 5. There is no new fundamental difficulty in proving the theorem.

Remark: It is trivial to prove that all safety hyperproperties are preserved under refinement. An intuitive way to understand Theorem 6 is as a generalization of this result to the case where we may have extra actions (invalid inputs) in the target. Basically, Definition 13 strengthens the source property by allowing for some extra behaviour in the target, namely responding to invalid inputs by \checkmark 's. TP can be seen as a slight weakening of refinement from source to target, that also allows similar extra behaviour in the target. Theorem 6 then says that this weakened form of refinement preserves the strengthened source properties.

3) *Non-Interference Preservation*: Theorem 6 states that a TP compiler preserves hypersafety properties under a specific translation. An obvious question is whether that translation itself is meaningful, in the sense that it preserves the *intents* of the source hypersafety properties. While a generic answer to this question is impossible to provide (since intent is property-specific), we show here that for a widely considered hypersafety property, namely, non-interference, this is the case under a specific condition on \approx . Non-interference is a security policy for information flow control which says that the public (low) outputs of a program must be independent of secret (high) inputs. In other words, in any two traces that agree on all low inputs, all high outputs must also be the same.

To formalize the property, assume that in both the source and the target, inputs and outputs are classified into low and high. Define an equivalence of actions $=_L$ as follows:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{(Low-equiv. on low actions)} \qquad \text{(Low-equiv. on high actions)} \\ \frac{\alpha, \alpha' \text{ are low} \quad \alpha \equiv \alpha'}{\alpha =_L \alpha'} \qquad \frac{\alpha, \alpha' \text{ are high}}{\alpha =_L \alpha'} \end{array}$$

Then, NI can be defined as follows by overloading the $=_L$ notation to lift point-wise to sets of actions.¹

Definition 14 (NI as a hyperproperty). Recall that $\bar{\alpha}|_I$ and $\bar{\alpha}|_O$ extract inputs and outputs of $\bar{\alpha}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NI} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & \{ \hat{\alpha} \mid \forall \bar{\alpha}_1, \bar{\alpha}_2 \in \hat{\alpha}. \\ & \text{if } \bar{\alpha}_1|_I =_L \bar{\alpha}_2|_I \text{ then } \bar{\alpha}_1|_O =_L \bar{\alpha}_2|_O \} \end{aligned}$$

NI is a safety hyperproperty. A pair of trace prefixes is bad if the prefixes agree on low inputs but disagree on low outputs. The following theorem shows that a source's NI when translated as described in Theorem 6 yields a hyperproperty that is contained in the target's NI, if \approx_O satisfies a specific *injectivity* condition. This immediately implies that if a source program satisfies NI then compiling it through a TP compiler yields a program that satisfies NI. The injectivity condition means that every source symbol is related to a unique target symbol. This is required to prevent the compiler from encoding secrets in different representations of the same low output. Additionally, all elements of $\hat{\checkmark}$ are considered to be observable, i.e., tagged as low.

¹This is just one possible definition of NI in a reactive setting. See the work of Bohannon *et al.* [16] for a detailed discussion of definitions of NI in a reactive setting.

Definition 15 (Injectivity). We say that \approx is injective if $\alpha \approx \alpha_1$ and $\alpha \approx \alpha_2$ imply $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$.

Theorem 7 (Non-interference is preserved). Let $M :: \text{NI}$ and \approx_O be injective. Let $M \stackrel{\text{SHP}}{\approx} M$ and let S be a hyperproperty such that $M :: S$. Then, $\forall \hat{\alpha} \in S, \hat{\alpha} \in \text{NI}$.

C. Limitations of TPC and Secure Compilation

Like most work on secure compilation, TPC does not aim to preserve liveness properties. In fact, it seems impossible to preserve liveness properties in general since the program’s low-level context can always starve the program of valid inputs. However, it may be possible to prove that liveness properties are preserved under fair contexts that always eventually provide a valid input. (Our technical report develops this point further.)

Going beyond liveness, the larger class of hyperliveness properties includes properties such as “the average response time of the program is less than 3 steps of computation”. Such properties are not preserved by TPC even under fairness assumptions on the context.

V. TRACE-PRESERVING AND FULLY ABSTRACT COMPILATION

This section proves that trace preservation and full abstraction are not equivalent: a TP compiler is FA but not vice-versa (Section V-A). Then, it defines fail-safe behaviour (FSB), an additional property that, if satisfied by a correct compiler, implies that the compiler also has TP^H , the halting variant of TPC (Section V-B).

A. Relation between TP and FA

In order to relate TP and FA, for the rest of this section we assume that \approx is injective as in Definition 15. This is not an unrealistic assumption, since many existing fully abstract compilers based on contextual equivalence satisfy this assumption and, in fact, it seems that writing a fully abstract meaningful compiler without this assumption may be impossible, as illustrated in the following example.

Example 6 (FA requires injectivity). Consider the source language of Example 3 and the two programs $\lambda x. \text{true}$ and $\lambda x. (\text{true} \vee \text{false})$ that implement the constant function that returns **true**. These two programs are (trivially) trace-equivalent. Suppose this language is compiled to λ^N and that, for the sake of argument, the relation \approx is not injective: it relates **false** ≈ 0 and **true** $\approx 1, 2, \dots$. Consider a compiler that maps the two source functions to $\lambda x. 1$ and $\lambda x. 2$, respectively. By having multiple mappings for **true** the target equivalence is broken and this compiler is trivially not FA: the two target programs are not trace equivalent, even though the two source programs are. \square

With injectivity, trace-preserving compilation implies fully abstract compilation (Theorem 8).

Theorem 8 (TP implies FA). $\forall [\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^S, [\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in TP \Rightarrow [\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in FA$.

The converse of Theorem 8 is false because there are fully abstract compilers that are not trace-preserving.

Theorem 9 (FA does not imply TP). $\exists [\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in FA. [\cdot]_{\mathcal{T}}^S \notin TP$.

Proof. There are many compilers that are in FA but not in TP. The compiler of Example 2 is one such example. Here, we present a second, non-trivial example. Consider a source language λ^B , which is a generalisation of the language of Example 1 that allows arbitrary operations on booleans and the target language λ^N from Example 3, which now includes min and max operations on natural numbers. While both languages are λ -calculi with higher-order functions, we restrict top-level programs in λ^B to input and output booleans, i.e., to the type $\text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool}$. Similarly, top-level λ^N programs input and output numbers, i.e., they have the type $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. The top-level programs of the two languages are denoted C and C , respectively. The type system of both languages is omitted for brevity, but the syntax is shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} C &::= \mathbf{f}(x) = t & C &::= \mathbf{f}(x) = e \\ t &::= \mathbf{true} \mid \mathbf{false} \mid x \mid t \ t \mid \lambda x : \tau. t \mid t \wedge t \mid t \vee t \mid \mathbf{f} \\ e &::= n \in \mathbb{N} \mid x \mid e \ e \mid \lambda x. e \mid \min(e, e) \mid \max(e, e) \mid \mathbf{f} \end{aligned}$$

Both languages follow a call-by-value reduction which is straightforward but for the evaluation of $\min()$ and $\max()$. The former follows Rule λ^N -eval-min as presented below, while the latter follows an analogous rule.

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} (\lambda^N\text{-eval-min}) \\ \text{if } v_1 \in \mathbb{N} \text{ then } v_1 = v_1 \text{ else } v_1 = 1 \\ \text{if } v_2 \in \mathbb{N} \text{ then } v_2 = v_2 \text{ else } v_2 = 1 \\ \text{if } v_1 > v_2 \text{ then } v = v_1 \text{ else } v = v_2 \end{array}}{\min(v_1, v_2) \hookrightarrow v}$$

The relation between the languages is that of Example 3: it includes **true** ≈ 1 and **false** ≈ 0 and is defined inductively on other terms based on their type.

Consider the two-step compiler $[\cdot]_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B}$ from λ^B to λ^N shown in Figure 2. The compiler maps **Bool** to \mathbb{N} . At the top-level, in the translation of $\mathbf{f}(x) = t$, it modifies the input x to $\min(x, 1)$ before passing it to the translation of t . So, the translation of t only receives valid inputs (0 or 1).

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \mathbf{f}(x) = t \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= (\mathbf{f}(x) = \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} [\min(x, 1)/x]) \\ \llbracket \mathbf{true} \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= 1 & \llbracket x \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= x \\ \llbracket \mathbf{false} \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= 0 & \llbracket \mathbf{f} \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= \mathbf{f} \\ \llbracket \lambda x : \tau. t \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= \lambda x. \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} & \llbracket t \ t' \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} \llbracket t' \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} \\ \llbracket t_1 \wedge t_2 \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= \min(\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B}, \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B}) \\ \llbracket t_1 \vee t_2 \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B} &= \max(\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B}, \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B}) \end{aligned}$$

Fig. 2. Example of a fully abstract compiler.

It is straightforward to prove that $[\cdot]_{\lambda^N}^{\lambda^B}$ is correct and that it is fully abstract (as proven in the technical report). However, the compiler is not trace-preserving. On an invalid input like

2 every compiled program still produces either 0 or 1, both of which correspond to source values and, hence, are not \checkmark s.

In fact, this compiler does not preserve all safety properties in the sense of Theorem 5. Consider the source program $f(x) = x$. This program satisfies the safety property “Output **true** only in response to **true**.” Its translation $f(x) = \min(x, 1)$ does not satisfy the translation of this safety property. In fact, it outputs 1 (the translation of **true**) in response to input 7. The translation of the safety property in Theorem 5 will require that the program produce \checkmark in response to the input 7. \square

B. FA Can Imply TPC

Many existing fully abstract compilers actually satisfy TPC. This is because they either prevent invalid inputs by using a target-level type system [8], [7], [17], [24] or halt the program on invalid inputs [38], [5], [27], [21]. In this section, we characterize this kind of enforcement of full abstraction as another property we call fail-safe behaviour or *FSB*, and prove that together with compiler correctness it implies TP^H .

Intuitively, “fail-safe behaviour” (*FSB*) means that the program halts (stutters with non-source outputs forever) after an invalid input.

Definition 16 (Fail-safe-behaviour compiler). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in FSB \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \mathbf{C}. \forall \bar{\alpha} \in \text{TR}(\llbracket \mathbf{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}})$. if $\nexists \bar{\alpha} \in \text{TR}(\mathbf{C}). \bar{\alpha} \approx \bar{\alpha}$, then $\bar{\alpha} \equiv \bar{m}_1 \alpha? \checkmark \bar{\alpha}_2$ and $\exists \bar{m}_1 \in \text{obs}(\text{TR}(\mathbf{C}))$. $\bar{m}_1 \approx \bar{m}_1$ and $\nexists \alpha? \approx \alpha?$ and $\nexists \checkmark \in \bar{m}_1$ and $\bar{\alpha}_2|_O = \checkmark$.

FSB is very similar to the halting version of TPC. We formalise *FSB* this way since it is the one most similar to what existing secure compilers do. We rely on this definition to prove that a compiler that is both *FSB* and *CC* is TP^H (Theorem 10).

Theorem 10 (Correctness and fail-safe behaviour imply trace-preservation). $\forall \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}}$. if $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in CC$ and $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in FSB$ then $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} \in TP^H$.

VI. BEYOND REACTIVE PROGRAMS

In this section we discuss how our results apply to a non-reactive setting, where the focus is not the program’s I/O behaviour but its code. This is the setting for a lot of existing work on secure compilation. We set up some formal background in Section VI-A and generalize some of our definitions to the non-reactive setting in Section VI-B. We then prove that an existing secure (fully abstract) compiler is actually *FSB*, thus showing that it also has the halting variant of TPC (Section VI-C).

A. Formal Tools for Non-Reactive Languages

Several existing work on secure compilation is for sequential programs [7], [8], [17], [5], [27], [29], [24], [38], [40], [31]. In these cases, program are related via a notion of contextual equivalence (Section VI-A1) or well-behaved contextual equivalence (Section VI-A2). The behaviour of programs can also be described via traces (Section VI-A3),

but additional properties need to be proven in order for the trace semantics to be meaningful.

1) *Contextual Equivalence*: Contextual equivalence is the coarsest program equivalence that the operational semantics of a language yield [43]. It is used to reason about programs of the same language.

As the name suggests, contextual equivalence relies on the notion of *context*. A (program) context is a partial program with a hole ($[\cdot]$), so it follows the same syntax and typing (if any) of programs. Formally, $\mathbb{C} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C[\cdot]$. The hole in the context can be filled by another program; this results in a whole program that can be executed according to the language semantics.

Informally, two *partial programs* C are contextually equivalent if they have the same behaviour for any possible context \mathbb{C} that they are plugged to. Having the same behaviour means that the two programs cannot be distinguished just by looking at the outputs.

Definition 17 (Contextual equivalence [43]). $C_1 \simeq_{ctx} C_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \mathbb{C}. \mathbb{C}[C_1] \uparrow \iff \mathbb{C}[C_2] \uparrow$, where \uparrow indicates divergence, i.e., the execution of an unbounded number of reduction steps. Divergence can be replaced by termination; the two formulations are equivalent.

2) *Well-Behaved Contexts*: Reasoning about programs written in different languages is often done by means of a cross-language relation \sim . Unlike relations \approx_I and \approx_O (from Section II-B), relation \sim is not only defined on inputs and outputs, but on all language-related elements (values, terms, contexts, etc). Often such a relation is instantiated with a cross-language logical relation [26], [13], [14], [6], [34], [35]. \sim lets us define the set of well-behaved target contexts w.r.t. the source language, i.e., target-level contexts that have a source-level counterpart (Definition 18).

Definition 18 (Well-behaved \mathcal{T} contexts w.r.t. \mathcal{S}). $WBctx_{\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{S}} = \{ \mathbf{C} \mid \exists \mathbf{C}. \mathbf{C} \sim \mathbf{C} \}$

Example 7 (Well-behaved contexts). Consider the source language of Example 2 and the target language λ^N . Assume \sim contains the following: **true** \sim 1 and **false** \sim 0.

Consider the context $[\cdot]$ 1, whose hole expects a function; this is well-behaved, since it is related to the source-level context $[\cdot]$ **true**. On the other hand, the context $[\cdot]$ 3 is not well-behaved. No source-level context relates to it, as no source-level context ever applies a value related to 3 to a function. \square

3) *Trace Semantics*: Trace equivalence is another tool to reason about two partial programs written in the same language, and it is often simpler to reason with than contextual equivalence [39], [38], [5], [27], [28]. Trace equivalence relates two components that exhibit the same trace semantics, i.e., whose behaviour can be described with the same set of traces (as in Definition 2).

Formally, in the sequential setting, a trace semantics is a triple: $\text{TR} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \Sigma; \alpha; \xrightarrow{\alpha} \}$. Σ is the set of states of the trace

semantics. Σ must include two kinds of states: operational semantics states and “unknown” ones. The former model execution within the component while the latter model execution outside of it. α are the actions that can be generated by the semantics, they follow the formalisation of actions and traces presented in Definition 2. $\xrightarrow{\bar{\alpha}} \subseteq \Sigma \times \bar{\alpha} \times \Sigma$ is a relation that specifies how actions are concatenated into traces $\bar{\alpha}$.

The trace semantics of a program C , denoted $TR(C)$, is the set of traces it can generate from its starting state $\Sigma^0(C)$.

Definition 19 (Trace semantics). $TR(C) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\bar{\alpha} \mid \exists \Sigma. \Sigma^0(C) \xrightarrow{\bar{\alpha}} \Sigma\}$.

Two programs are trace equivalent if their trace semantics coincide, as already formalised in Definition 3.

When a language is defined, its operational semantics yield contextual equivalence. Many applications of trace semantics require showing that trace equivalence coincides with contextual equivalence. Formally, this is called full abstraction of the trace semantics (Definition 20).² Let FAT be the set of all fully abstract trace semantics.

Definition 20 (Fully abstract trace semantics). $TR \in FAT \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall C_1, C_2. C_1 \simeq_{ctx} C_2 \iff C_1 \stackrel{T}{=} C_2$

The simplest way to develop a fully abstract trace semantics is by construction, i.e., to devise traces from the operational semantics. However this is not always possible nor simple, so devising a fully abstract trace semantics for complex systems is an active research topic [28], [39], [30], [46].

B. Non-Reactive Trace-Preserving Compilation

To make **TPC** meaningful in a non-reactive setting, both the source and the target languages must have fully abstract trace semantics, with which their hyperproperties are expressed. This can be expressed through two assumptions.

Assumption 1 (The source-level trace semantics **TR** is fully abstract). $TR \in FAT$.

Assumption 2 (The target-level trace semantics **TR** is fully abstract). $TR \in FAT$.

Assumption 2 does not need to hold in general but just for compiled components, i.e., for a subset of the programs of \mathcal{T} , the target language.

No existing work on secure compilation satisfies both these assumptions as no existing work was interested in understanding the connection to hyperproperties so far. Some existing work, however, satisfies Assumption 2, as they equip the target language with fully abstract trace semantics for simplifying their proofs of full abstraction [27], [38], [40], [39], [31].

1) *Non-Reactive Fail-Safe Behaviour*: Definition 21 redefines FSB from Definition 16 without traces. Let $\mathbb{C} \cap \mathbb{C}$ indicate that \mathbb{C} and \mathbb{C} are compatible, so \mathbb{C} can fill the hole of \mathbb{C} .

²Standard terminology may be confusing since full abstraction is used for both compilers and semantics. When the qualifier ‘compiler’ or ‘semantics’ is omitted, it should be clear from the context which notion is meant.

Definition 21 (Fail-safe-behaviour compiler (without traces)). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S \in FSB \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall \mathbb{C} \notin WBctx_{\mathcal{T}}^S, \forall \mathbb{C}. \text{ if } \mathbb{C} \cap \llbracket \mathbb{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S, \text{ then } \mathbb{C}[\llbracket \mathbb{C} \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S] \hookrightarrow^* t \text{ and } \exists t_{\text{stuck}}. t \simeq_{ctx} t_{\text{stuck}} \text{ and } \forall \mathbb{C}'. \mathbb{C}'[t_{\text{stuck}}] \not\rightarrow.$

The intuition for Definition 21 is that for any invalid interaction (i.e., an interaction with a context \mathbb{C} that is not well-behaved) a compiled component reduces to a term t that is equivalent to a term t_{stuck} that cannot reduce any further (in any context). t_{stuck} , and its equivalent terms, correspond to \surd . This models what some existing fully abstract compilers do—they halt when some invalid interaction is detected. Instead of enforcing that t is stuck, we require it to be equivalent to a stuck term to model, for example, reduction to a function that will get stuck when it is applied.

C. TPC for an Existing Fully Abstract Compiler

Many existing fully abstract compilers actually achieve **TPC**. In this section, we substantiate this point on one fully abstract compiler, that of Devriese *et al.* [21], by showing that it is FSB according to Definition 21. Thus, if fully abstract trace semantics were given to the languages (to reason about hyperproperties), it would be TP . We work with this compiler since it is simple enough to prove Definition 21 easily.

For the compiler of this section, the source language λ^{τ} is a simply-typed λ -calculus with booleans, unit and a fixpoint operator while the target language λ^u is an untyped λ -calculus with primitive boolean and unit literals. The operational semantics of both languages is unsurprising and, like the syntax, in large part omitted here. The only interesting cases are the reduction of **fix** in λ^{τ} and how λ^u treats non well-formed arguments, which are presented below (the latter is presented only in the case of sequencing and if-then-else).

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{(\lambda}^{\tau}\text{-Eval-fix)} \\
 \hline
 \text{fix}_{\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2} (\lambda x : \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2. t) \hookrightarrow \\
 t[(\lambda y : \tau_1. \text{fix}_{\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2} (\lambda x : \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2. t) y) / x] \\
 \text{(\lambda}^u\text{-Eval-if-v)} \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{ll}
 \text{(\lambda}^u\text{-Eval-seq-next)} & v \equiv \text{true} \Rightarrow t' \equiv t_1 \\
 v \equiv \text{unit} \Rightarrow t' \equiv t & v \equiv \text{false} \Rightarrow t' \equiv t_2 \\
 v \neq \text{unit} \Rightarrow t' \equiv \text{wrong} & (v \neq \text{true} \wedge v \neq \text{false}) \\
 & \Rightarrow t' \equiv \text{wrong} \\
 v; t \hookrightarrow t' & \text{if } v \text{ then } t_1 \text{ else } t_2 \hookrightarrow t'
 \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda^u}^{\lambda^{\tau}}$ is the fully abstract compiler from λ^{τ} and λ^u ; it is defined as follows:

$$\text{if } t : \tau \text{ then } \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\lambda^u}^{\lambda^{\tau}} = \text{protect}_{\tau} \text{erase}(t)$$

where $\text{erase}()$ is a type-erasing function and protect is a dynamic typechecker on arguments received from the context whose definition is shown in our technical report. Any argument that does not respect the expected structure will cause protect to reduce to wrong , without executing the securely-compiled code. Intuitively, wrong is the \surd (or the term t from Definition 21).

The compiler is correct (Theorem 11) and FSB (Theorem 12), so it is trace-preserving (Theorem 13).

Theorem 11 ($\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda^u}^{\lambda^{\tau}}$ is correct). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda^u}^{\lambda^{\tau}} \in CC$.

Proof. See [21]. \square

Theorem 12 ($\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda_u}^{\tau}$ has fail-safe behaviour). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda_u}^{\tau} \in FSB$.

Proof Sketch. Intuitively, all ill-behaved interactions either reduce to **wrong** immediately or reduce to functions whose body will reduce to **wrong** once an argument is supplied. Consider the term **true**; its compilation is $(\lambda x. x) \text{ true}$. Consider the following non-well-behaved context for the term above which tries to use it as a function instead of as a Boolean: $\mathbb{C} = [\cdot] \text{ true}$. Once the compiled term is plugged into \mathbb{C} , the resulting term performs the following reductions: $((\lambda x. x) \text{ true}) \text{ true} \leftrightarrow \text{true true} \leftrightarrow \text{wrong}$. \square

Theorem 13 ($\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda_u}^{\tau}$ is trace-preserving). $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\lambda_u}^{\tau} \in TP^H$.

VII. RELATED WORK

Prior work has mostly used either full abstraction or noninterference preservation as the criterion for soundness of secure compilers.

Compiler full abstraction was introduced by Abadi [1], to argue against the compilation of inner classes in an early version of the JVM and as a way to show the soundness of a compilation of the π -calculus into the SPI-calculus. Papers that prove full abstraction achieve this by relying on different target-language features: type systems [8], [7], [17], cryptographic primitives [18], [20], [2], memory protection techniques [5], [27], [38], [40] and dynamic checks [21], [24]. Two main approaches exist to proving compiler full abstraction: cross-language logical relations [8], [17], [7], [21] and target-level trace semantics [27], [38], [28]. The conditions that make fully abstract compilation between two languages possible have been identified by Parrow [37]. Gorla and Nestmann [25] concluded that full abstraction is meaningful only when it entails properties such as security, thus supporting the motivation for our work. No existing work argues for a general connection between full abstraction (or secure compilation) with hyperproperties. The closest pieces of work related to hyperproperty preservation via compilation are those whose proof is based on trace semantics, as they already fulfil some of the requirements of **TPC**.

Some prior work [10], [11], [12] provides secure compilers that preserve specific hyperproperties, notably noninterference. In all cases, the target language is assumed to be well-typed. Since both the source and target type systems imply noninterference, compiler type preservation implies noninterference preservation. Tse and Zdancewic present a noninterference-preserving secure compiler from the dependency core calculus (DCC) to System F [45].

Recently, secure compartmentalizing compilation (SCC) has also been proposed as a criterion for secure compilation. SCC addresses some limitations of “vanilla” compiler full abstraction related to modularity [29]. The main differences between **TPC** and SCC are that (i) SCC considers non-deterministic source languages, and (ii) SCC enforces a fixed structure on the components that encompasses the whole source program. SCC additionally considers modular compilers, but **TPC** can

also be adapted to modular compilers (see the technical report for details). In the SCC work, the authors suggest a way to turn compiler full abstraction into SCC by handling the aforementioned issues. We believe that the same approach can be taken with **TPC** to ensure that it also implies SCC. Concerning (i), the non-determinism in source languages for SCC compilers is restricted to affect just the component where the non-determinism happens. Concerning (ii), the notion of plugging programs and contexts is made to adhere to a given shape (or interface), which specifies how the rest of the program is compartmentalised. We believe that by adding the same restriction to the source languages, **TPC** can scale to non-deterministic languages and to programs that have a stipulated structure.

TPC (and more generally secure compilation) also bears a close connection with security policies enforcement by means of runtime monitors. Literature on enforcing security properties has developed several automata to enforce safety properties. The seminal work of Schneider [44] defines truncation automata, which terminate a program when an undesired action is encountered. Ligatti *et al.* [33] define suppression automata, which prevent specific program actions but do not alter program behaviour otherwise. The latter kind of automata were further studied by Bielova and Massacci [15] in the context of suppressing behaviour but resuming again from a good program state. The halting variant of **TPC** can be seen as a truncating automaton wrapped around compiled code while the disregarding variant can be seen as a suppression automaton wrapped around compiled code. However, the aforementioned work does not consider a cross-language setting.

Trace semantics have been used to reason about the security properties of reactive systems [47], [23]. We believe that such work can be a good starting point for understanding how to expand the results of this paper to non-deterministic systems.

In this work, as in many others on fully abstract compilation, we consider possible optimisations to be a part of $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\mathcal{T}}^S$. Thus, these results can be made to scale to optimizing compilers as long as the optimisations respect the assumptions needed by **TPC**. The work of D’Silva *et al.* [22] studies the problem of securing compiler optimisation as a separate phase, clearly identifying which compiler optimisations would violate such assumptions.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This paper presented a new correctness criterion, **TPC**, for secure compilation. We show that this criterion preserves safety and hypersafety properties under suitable source-to-target translations of the properties. We show that the criterion is stronger than full abstraction for compilers, but can be attained with little more effort beyond that needed to attain full abstraction. At least one existing fully abstract compiler already attains **TPC**.

We believe that this paper clarifies what secure compilation means in terms of preservation of security-relevant (hyper)properties. Additionally, it clarifies the limitations and

relevance of fully abstract compilation in the context of security.

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